Saturday, September 27, 2014

Globalisation and the future of Postcolonial Studies

Topic :- Globalisation and the future of Postcolonial Studies
Name :- Chauhan Sejal Arunbhai
Subject :- The Postcolonial Literature.
Paper :- 11
Roll No :-
M.A. PART-II SEM-III
Year- 2013-15
Submitted to :- Dr.Dilip.Barad
Smt.S.B.Gardi
Department of English
M.K.Bhavnagar University.





Globalisation and the future of Postcolonial Studies
                As we know that since the events of 11 September 2001, the so-called global war on terror and the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is harder than ever to see our world as simply “postcolonial”. As the new American Empire develops openly and shrilly advocated by policy- makers, politicians and academics within the Us and elsewhere, it is more urgent than ever to think about the questions of domination and resistance that have been raised by anti-colonial movements and postcolonial studies worldwide. At the same time, these violent events are also part of the phenomenon we think of as blobalisation, which has provided fresh grounds for examining the relevance of postcolonial perspectives to the world which we now inhabit. Globalisation seems to have transformed the world so radically, many of its advocates and critics suggest that it has rendered obsolete a critical and analytical perspective which takes the history and legacy of European colonialism as its focal point. It is meaningless to continue to define our world in relation to the dynamics of European colonialism or decolonization. Globalisation, they argue cannot be analyzed using concepts like margins and centres so central to postcolonial studies.
                Today’s economics, politics, cultures and identities are all better described in terms of transnational networks, regional and international flows and the dissolution of geographic and cultural borders, paradigms which are familiar to postcolonial critics but which are now invoked to suggest a radical break with the narratives of colonization and anti-colonialism.
                  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire argues that the contemporary global order has produced a new form of sovereignty which should be called ‘Empire’ but which is best understood in contrast to European empires:
In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities , flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperial map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.
Empire argues that whereas the old imperial world was marked by competition between different European powers, the new order is characterized by a
“single power that over determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonialist and postimperialist.”
Hardt and Negri do not identity the United States as this new power, although they do argue that ‘Empire is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’, a project which sought to include and incorporate minorities into the mainstream rather simply expel or exclude them. Likewise, contemporary Empire is ‘imperial and not imperialist’ because it does not consist of powerful nations that aim to’ invade, destroy and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty’ as the old powers did but rather to absorb them into a new international network.
                       Hardt and Negri suggest that the new Empire is better compared to the Roman Empire rather than to European colonialism, since imperial Rome also loosely incorporated its subject states rather than controlling them directly.
                        Susie O’Brien and Imre Szeman believe that ‘characterizing US political and cultural power as a global dominants from a more thorough examination of sites and modalities of power in the global era’; accordingly they celebrate Empire as ‘ Exceptionally helpful in advancing our capacity to think past the reinscription of globalization as a centre/ periphery dynamic that produces resistant margins and hegemonic cores’.
                       In their view it is this model of margin and which has prevented postcolonial studies from being able to analyse the operations of contemporary power.
                      Other critics warn that geopolitical centres and margins have not simply evaporated and that globalization has intensified pre-existing global asymmetries, particularly those that were produced by modern colonialism. Tim Brennan observes that Empire ‘has almost nothing to say about the actual people and histories the empires left behind the authors barely nod in the direction of quest worker systems, uncapitalized agriculture, and the archipelago of maquiladoras at the heart of globalization’s gulag … the colonized of today are given little place in the book’s sprawling thesis about multitudes, biopolitical control, and the creation of alternative values’.
                     The controversy about Empire is thus shaped by wider and ongoing debates about the nature and effects of globalization. Hardt and Negri’s Post Foucaultian emphasis and indeed their suggestion that global networks have not only changed the nature of repression but will in fact facilitate resistance by the global ‘multitude’ from diverse locations all over the world, resonates in disturbing ways with the claims of globalisation’s neo-liberal advocates who argue that the global mobility of capital, Industry, workers, goods and consumers dissolves earlier hierarchies and inequities, democratizes nations and the relations between nations and creates new opportunities which percolate down in some form or another to every section of society. These claims are also echoed by many cultural critics for example, in Appadurai’s Modernity at Large, catalogues of ‘multiple locations’ and new hybridities new forms of communication, new foods, new clothes and evidence for both the newness and the benefits of globalization.
                      Such a connection is precisely what many of the writings on globalization proclaim. Whereas the advocates of globalization see the new economic order as already having engendered better lives for people, Hardt and Negri suggest that the new cultural, economic and political flows offer ‘new possibilities to the forces of liberation’ because global power can then be challenged from multiple sites by its multiple subjects whom they refer to as the ‘multitude’.
                       Culturalist views of differences moreover, are for from being entirely new products of globalization. Balibar himself connects neo-racism to the anti-semitism of the Renaissance. More recently Lisa Lampert indicates the congruence between Samuel Huntington’s rhetoric of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and medieval anti-semitism and Islamophobia. Early modern views of Muslims and Jews are also important in reminding us that ‘culture’ and ‘biology’ have in fact never been neatly separable categories and that strategies of inclusion and exclusion have always worked hand in hand. Thus, it was the mass conversion of Jews and Moors after they were officially expelled from Catholic Spain in 1492 that intensified anxieties about Christian identity. It was then that the Inquisition formulated the ‘pure blood’ laws which engendered pseudo-biological ideologies of differences (see Friedman 1987; Loomba 2002). On the other hand, in the heyday of imperialism too, as I have already discussed at some length, racial ideologies did not work through the ideology of exclusion alone but always strategically appropriated and included many of its others.
                   Critics of globalization do not deny the fact or the transformatory powers of the phenomenon, or the many ways in which it indeed marks a departure from the old world order. But they contest its supposedly democratizing effects or radical potential, and point out that by treating contemporary globalization as if it did not have a history, its inequities tend to get obscured. There is no doubt that globalization has made information and technology more widely available and has brought economic prosperity to certain new sections of the world. However, the mobility of capital, P.Sainath observes, for from fostering ideological openness, has resulted in its own fundamentalism, which then catalyses others in reaction:
Market fundamentalism destroys more human lives than any other simply because it cuts across all national, cultural, geographic, religious and other boundaries. It’s as much at home in Moscow as in Mumbai or Minnesota. A South Africa whose advances in the early 1990s thrilled the world moved swiftly from apartheid to neo-liberalism. It sits as easily in Hindu, Islamic or Christian societies. And it contributes angry, despairing recruits to the armies of all religious fundamentalisms. Based on the premise that the market is the solution to all the problems of the human race, it is too, a very religious fundamentalism. It has its own Gospel: The Gospel of St.Growth, of St choice…..
                       Not everyone has forgotten that legacy of that first global asymmetry upon which ours is built. Here is a report from The New York Times (Friday October 17, 2003) speaking of huge demonstrations in La Paz which defied military barricades to protest a plan to export natural gas to the United States:
‘ Globalization is just another name for submission and domination’, Nicanor Apaza,46, an unemployed miner, said at a demonstration this week in which Indian Women…..carried banners denouncing the International Monetary Fund and demanding the president’s resignation, ‘we’ve had to live with that here for 500 years, and now we want to be our own masters.’
                           He and many other protesters see an unbroken line from this region’s often rapacious colonial history to the failed economic experiments of the late 20th century, in which Bolivia was one of the first Latin American Countries to open itself to the modern global economy. The $5 billion gas pipeline project is only the latest gambit.
Starting with the end of a military dictatorship two years ago, Bolivia embraced the free market model. State-owned companies were sold off Foreign investment was courted Government regulation was reduced Exports have actually declined compared with their level 25 years ago. Growth has stalled for the pats few years Unemployment has soared, and Bolivia remains the poorest country in South America, with a per capita income….less than it was before the free market reforms.
                                       ……In the colonial era, silver from the mines of Potosi provided Spain with the wealth that allowed it to forge a global empire, and in modern times, tin made a few families…….fabulously wealthy.
                             It is not only the vulnerable and those at the receiving end who make the connections between past empires and the global economy. Joseph E Stiglitz ,Noble laureate and once Chief Economist at the World Bank, also uses the phrase ‘market fundamentalism ‘ in his critique of globalization as it has been imposed upon the world by institutions like the World Bank and the IMF:
The international financial institutions have pushed a particular ideology market fundamentalism that is both bad economics and bad politics: it is based on premises concerning how markets work that do not hold even for developed countries, much less for developing countries. The IMF has pushed these economics policies without a broader vision of society or the role of economics within society. And it has pushed these politics in ways that have undermined emerging democracies. More generally, globalization itself has been governed in ways that are undemocratic and have been disadvantageous to developing countries, especially the poor within those countries.  
Stiglitz connect these developments to colonialism, suggesting that ‘ the IMF’s approaches to developing countries has the feel of a colonial ruler.’ And that developing countries dealing with the IMF have been forced to ask ‘ a very disturbing question: Had things really changed since the “official” ending of colonialism a half century ago?’
                             Advocates of the new American empire simultaneously appropriate the legacy of earlier empires and claim a radical exceptionalism for a US empire. This strategy is exemplified by an essay in The Atlantic Montly by Robert D. Kaplan tellingly entitled ‘supremacy by Stealth; in which he sees no contradiction between global networks of the kind identified by Hardt and Negri and an American hegemony:
The historian Erich S. Green has observed that Rome’s expansion throughout the Meditrranean littoral may well have been motivated not by an appetite for conquest per se but because it was thought necessary for the security of the core homeland. The same is true for the United States worldwide, in an age of collapsed distances. This American imperium is without colonies, designed for a jet and information age in which mars movements of people and capital dilute the traditional meaning of sovereignty.  
                            Kalplan offers ten rules for the US Empire, all of which require him to go back to the British Empire, but also to America’s own past. Rule No.1, called ‘Manliness’, invokes the male bonding that supposedly existed between British colonizers and the more refined of their subjects. Rule No.5, ‘Be Light and Lethal’, asks imperialists to openly appropriate and rewrite history: ‘although many journalists and intellectuals have regarded as something to be ashamed of, the for more significant, operational truth is that it exemplifies how we should act worldwide in the foreseeable future’.
                           This rewriting has, as we all know, begun to happen. The destructive histories of modern empires are being widely whitewashed. Thus David Cannadine’s Ornamentalism asks us to believe that there was no racism in the British Empire. Thus too George W Bush now claims that the United States freed Filipinos instead of colonizing them. Such whitewashing not only obscures, distorts and ignores anti-colonial and post=colonial scholarship but also directly attacks it. Dinesh D’Souza’s ‘Two Cheers for Colonialism’ claims that ‘apologists for terrorism’ such as ‘justification of violence’ rely on a large body of scholarship ‘which goes by the names of “anti-colonial studies”, “postcolonial studies”, or subaltern studies”,. Niall Ferguson claims to be disturbed be the fact that the British Empire has had a pretty lousy press from a generation of ‘postcolonial’ historians anachronistically affronted by its racism. But the reality is that the British were significantly more successful at establishing market economies, the rule of law and the transition to representative government than the majority of postcolonial governments have been. The policy ‘mix’ favored by Victorian imperialists reads like something just published by the International Monetary Fund, if not the world Bank: Free trade, balanced budgets, sound money, the common law, incorrupt administration and investment in infrastructure financed by international loans. These are precisely the things the world needs right now.
                           During the heyday of the British Empire, the medieval concept of translation imperii,which suggested that political power or legitimacy ‘translated’ first from Greece to Rome, and then to Western Europe, was freely invoked as justification of European imperialism. Today it surfaces again in order to anoint the US as Britain’s rightful heir:
Winston Churchill saw in the United States a worthy successor to the British Empire, one that would carry on Britain’s liberalizing mission. We cannot rest until something emerged that is just as estimable and concrete or what Churchill saw when he gazed across the Atlantic. (Kaplan)
And as Paul Johnson fervently puts it :
Fate, or Divine Providence, has placed America at this time in the position of sale superpower, with the consequent duty to uphold global order and to punish, or prevent, the great crimes of the world…..It must continue to engage the task imposed upon it, not in any spirit of hubris but in the full and certain knowledge that it is serving the best and widest interest of humanity.
                          This is precisely the rhetoric used by the Bush administration in its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Hardt and Negri’s suggestion that the United states acts as an imperial power ‘not as a function of its own motives but in the name of global right’ thus confuses the discursive self-promotion of US leaders with the actual dynamics of US military power today. As the world-wide protests against the war have made clear, neither people at large nor even most nation-states have given the US the right to act on their behalf and they certainly regard the US as simultaneously ultra-nationalist and imperialist.
                        It is clear, then, that US nationalism and national interests remain at least as important as the interests of particular multinational corporations in shaping these and other conflicts around the globe.
                       Thus, at the end we can say that it is not surprising that postcolonial studies should be attacked in such a situation; I have already mentioned some critiques, and they are escalating and taking new form every day. Stanley Kurtz, a fellow at Stanford University Hoover Institution, has urged the US House of Representatives to ensure that federal funding to ‘area studies’ centres in US universities is linked to their training studies for careers in national security, defence and intelligence agencies, and the Foreign service. Such centres have, he says, become ‘anti-American’ under the influence of postcolonial scholarship and especially Edward Said’s Orientalism:
‘Said equated professors who support American foreign policy with the 19th century European intellectuals who propped up racist colonial empires. The core premise of post-colonial theory is that it is immoral for a scholar to put his knowledge of foreign language and cultures at the service of American power (Kurtz).
                       In fact, one of Edward Said’s most valuable achievements in Orientalism was not simply to establish the connection between scholarship and sate power in the colonial period, but to indicate its afterlife in a ‘post colonial’ global formation with the US at its epicenter. If universities are to remain sites of dissent and free intellectual inquiry, if scholarship is not to be at the service of American or any other power, critiques of past and ongoing empires are going to be more necessary than ever. 



Reference:-
 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism/Ania Loomba/The New Critical Idiom pourledge/2005  

     
    
    
   






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